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1584 
Note 
Toward a Robust Separation of Powers: 
Recapturing the Judiciary’s Role at Sentencing 
Hans H. Grong∗ 
Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the 
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary con-
trol, for the judge would then be the legislator. 
—James Madison1 
 
American criminal law has expanded dramatically over the 
last fifty years.2 What began as a legislative attempt to codify 
the common law definitions of crimes quickly shifted into an 
expansive and detailed criminal law system.3 During the evolu-
tion of this area of law, the allocation of power between the 
three branches—particularly on the issues of defining crimes 
and sentencing individuals—shifted from a system based on 
judicial discretion within broad legislative parameters toward a 
system based on required judicial deference to broad legislative 
authority to define crimes as well as determine individual sen-
tences.4 
This Note argues that the Supreme Court’s recent sentenc-
ing jurisprudence has missed the mark by focusing too heavily 
on the individual rights provisions of the Sixth Amendment 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2005, 
Macalester College. I wish to thank Professor Stephen Cribari for his invalua-
ble guidance and revisions; Claire Deason, David Biggs, and Jeffrey Justman 
for their entertainment; and Kevin O’Riordan for his encouragement through-
out this process. I wish to offer a special thank you to David and Linda Grong 
for their unwavering support over the years. Copyright © 2008 by Hans H. 
Grong. 
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 310 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano 
ed., 2000) (quoting Charles de Secondat Montesquieu) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 2. See Ian Weinstein, The Revenge of Mullaney v. Wilbur: United States 
v. Booker and the Reassertion of Judicial Limits on Legislative Power to Define 
Crimes, 84 OR. L. REV. 393, 397 (2005). 
 3. See id. at 396–97. 
 4. See id. at 395–96. 
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and Due Process Clause at the expense of the structural con-
cerns of the separation of powers. The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (Guidelines) violate the separation of powers, and 
the Court’s jurisprudence has failed to address the problem. In 
its rush to ingrain the jury in the criminal process, the Court 
has missed the forest for the trees. The cases not only sort out 
the procedural requirements of the criminal process, but also 
the optimal balance of power between each branch of govern-
ment. 
Which branch of government has what power in the crimi-
nal process? This is the unstated question in the Court’s sen-
tencing cases. Congress’s 1984 approval of the Guidelines was 
the most systematic and sweeping accumulation of power with-
in the criminal process in the history of the Nation. The Court 
made multiple attempts to cure the constitutional violations re-
sulting from Congress’s action, but the analytic framework 
proved insufficient. Until the Court changes its analysis and 
recognizes the separation of powers concerns that underlie the 
current system, the Guidelines will continue to exert unaccept-
able legislative influence over the sentencing process. 
Part I of this Note provides the social, legislative, and judi-
cial history of the Guidelines and discusses the Supreme 
Court’s conventional individual rights approach to criminal 
procedure. Part II analyzes the intersection between the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine and the Guidelines, concluding that 
the Guidelines are a per se violation of the separation of pow-
ers. Part III proposes that the Court declare the Guidelines un-
constitutional in their current form, but allow Congress the 
choice between complete invalidation of the Guidelines or re-
quiring that all elements relevant to the Guidelines sentence be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES   
The history of the Guidelines is a culmination of social, po-
litical, and judicial developments that occurred over the past 
half century. This Part lays out the developments that led to 
the current approach to sentencing. It begins by examining 
America’s traditional approach as well as the social and politi-
cal transformations that uprooted the traditional system. It 
then examines the legislative history of the Guidelines as well 
as their practical application. Finally, this Part reviews the Su-
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preme Court’s approach to the criminal process and sentencing 
in particular. 
A. FEDERAL SENTENCING: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Traditionally, scholars read the Constitution as separating 
the legislature’s role of defining criminal activity, the execu-
tive’s role of enforcing criminal prohibitions, the jury’s role of 
adjudicating guilt, and the judiciary’s role of sentencing the 
convicted.5 The distinctions between defining, executing, adju-
dicating, and sentencing are at the heart of America’s criminal 
jurisprudence and the framers’ constitutional structure.6 
This conception of separated power informed and defined 
the sentencing structure prior to 1984. On one hand, the legis-
lature had nearly unfettered discretion to define the substan-
tive aspects of the criminal law.7 Within the confines of the 
Constitution,8 the legislature was free to define crimes as it 
saw fit to promote its policies.9 The furthest that the legislature 
would reach into sentencing was the enactment of a maximum 
sentence for a crime.10 The legislature exercised no control over 
the sentence imposed on any individual defendant.11 
 
 5. See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 2 (1998) (“In the American constitutional 
tradition, there has heretofore been a formal distinction between the process of 
crime definition (the responsibility of the legislative branch) and the process of 
criminal sentencing within the maximum penalties provided by statute (the 
responsibility of the judiciary . . . ).”). 
 6. See Jackie Gardina, Compromising Liberty: A Structural Critique of 
the Sentencing Guidelines, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 345, 378–82 (2005) (de-
monstrating that jury adjudication was a structural requirement in line with 
the separation of powers); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels 
Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers 
Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 463–65 (1991) (describing the rationale for the tra-
ditional tripartite separation of powers under the Constitution). 
 7. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 22.  
 8. The Constitution places structural, procedural, and substantive limits 
on Congress’s ability to define crimes. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 
(“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”). 
 9. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 479 (“‘[L]egislative’ power in-
cludes only the authority to promulgate generalized standards and require-
ments of citizen behavior or to dispense benefits—to achieve, maintain, or 
avoid particular social policy results.”). 
 10. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 9; Louis F. Oberdorfer, Lec-
ture, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge’s Perspective—2002, 40 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 11, 14 (2003). 
 11. See Oberdorfer, supra note 10, at 14 (describing the role the legisla-
ture played in sentencing prior to the Guidelines as limited to prescribing a 
“maximum, but not any minimum, sentence”). 
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On the other hand, the judiciary exercised broad discretion 
at sentencing.12 Once a jury decided the elements of a particu-
lar crime had been proven, the judge imposed on the defendant 
any sentence up to the statutory maximum.13 Not only was the 
sentence committed to the discretion of the judge, the decision 
was final.14 For the majority of the twentieth century, this sys-
tem of indeterminate sentencing was the norm not only in the 
federal system, but also in the states.15  
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL SENTENCING: 1970–
PRESENT  
This Section describes the shift away from the traditional 
model as a two-step process. The first step was the growth of 
social and political dissatisfaction with the traditional model’s 
results.16 The second was Congress’s dramatic solution to the 
perceived problem—the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.17 
1. Social and Political Developments of the 1970s 
In the 1970s, both legislators and judges questioned the 
rehabilitative penal philosophy underlying the discretionary 
sentencing structure.18 The “severe sentencing disparity among 
 
 12. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 9 (“From the beginning of the 
Republic, federal judges were entrusted with wide sentencing discretion.”). 
 13. See id. 
 14. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6 (1996) (“For all practic-
al purposes, appellate review of sentences . . . was nonexistent.”). 
 15. Id. at 4 (“In 1970, every state and the federal system had an ‘indeter-
minate sentencing system’ in which judges had wide discretion to decide who 
went to prison and to set maximum and sometimes minimum prison terms.”). 
 16. See Oberdorfer, supra note 10, at 14 (“In the early 1970s, public out-
rage about increasing violent crime was growing; Congress and state legisla-
tures were listening. From one segment of public opinion came complaints 
that some judges were too lenient . . . . From another segment came com-
plaints that sentences were too long . . . .”). 
 17. Technically, the Guidelines are a product of the United States Sen-
tencing Commission. Congress, however, created the Commission with the ex-
press purpose of enacting the Guidelines. This Note glosses over this distinc-
tion because, although fascinating, it is not relevant to the issue discussed 
here. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 324–25 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“The fact that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are promulgated 
by an administrative agency . . . is irrelevant . . . . The Guidelines have the 
force of law . . . .”). 
 18. See TONRY, supra note 14, at 13 (discussing the rise of “just deserts” 
as the dominant penal philosophy after the rejection of rehabilitation). See 
generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The 
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. 
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similarly situated defendants” eroded support for judicial dis-
cretion.19 Research indicated that sentences for identical crimes 
varied by up to seventeen years.20 The underlying issue, how-
ever, was not the disparity in and of itself but, rather, the cor-
relation between disparate sentences and factors such as race.21 
Reformers claimed judicial discretion was to blame for the dis-
parate sentences.22  
In response, Congress completely overhauled the sentenc-
ing system23 by “divest[ing] the independent Federal judiciary 
of the power to determine criminal sentences.”24 The shift of 
sentencing authority away from the independent judiciary was 
one of the most revolutionary developments of the criminal jus-
tice system in the last century.25 The Sentencing Manual re-
placed the discretion that the framers entrusted to the federal 
judiciary, which had existed for two hundred years of American 
legal history.26 
 
REV. 223 (1993) (providing a useful history of the political run-up to the Sen-
tencing Reform Act).  
 19. Gardina, supra note 6, at 354. 
 20. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key 
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1988) (detail-
ing the motivations behind the Guidelines push). But see STITH & CABRANES, 
supra note 5, at 106–12 (questioning the validity of research on disparity).  
 21. See Breyer, supra note 20, at 5. Disparity between the sentences given 
to individual defendants is not inappropriate unless it is based on an irrele-
vant factor. See Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American 
Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 528–29 (2007) (“Disparity 
inheres in any system that seeks to provide proportional punishment, that tai-
lors the punishment to fit, not just the crime, but the criminal, and that pur-
ports to be a national system.”). 
 22. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 17 (explaining the perceived 
incompatibility of judicial discretion with the “new rehabilitation model” of 
incarceration); Stith & Koh, supra note 18, at 228–29 (discussing the continu-
ing and forceful criticism levied by Judge Marvin E. Frankel—a federal dis-
trict judge in New York—against the judicial discretion model). Congress was 
concerned about what would become known as the “‘unjustifiably wide’ sen-
tencing disparity.” Breyer, supra note 20, at 4. 
 23. See Gardina, supra note 6, at 355 (“Congress enacted sweeping sen-
tencing reform that dramatically altered the way in which defendants con-
victed in federal court were sentenced.”). 
 24. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 1. 
 25. Id. at 2 (“The transfer of formal sentencing authority from federal 
judges to the Sentencing Commission is probably the most significant devel-
opment in judging in the federal judicial system since the adoption in 1938 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
 26. See id. at 1.  
GRONG_4FMT 5/24/2008  11:38 AM 
2008] THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE AT SENTENCING 1589 
 
2. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) accomplished 
this legislative reform of the sentencing system.27 It was 
enacted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984.28 According to Stephen Breyer, Congress contemplated 
“two primary purposes” for the SRA.29 Honesty in sentencing 
was the first;30 the SRA eliminated parole as an option in sen-
tencing and punishment.31 Reduction of the sentencing dispari-
ty was the second purpose.32 The SRA attempted to achieve this 
goal through two separate means: the creation of appellate re-
view of sentences,33 and the establishment of the United States 
Sentencing Commission (Commission) to promulgate sentenc-
ing guidelines.34 In hindsight, the combined effect of the elimi-
nation of parole and the creation of appellate review of sen-
tences has paled in comparison to the effect of the 
Commission.35 
On November 1, 1987, the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines took effect.36 The Guidelines are based on a chart or 
grid. The nature of the offense is on one axis and the defen-
dant’s criminal history is on the other.37 The box in which these 
two categories intersect in the Sentencing Table dictates the 
permissible sentence.38 The Guidelines are a legislative oddity; 
they have the force of law but are not attached to any particu-
 
 27. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 
Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). See 
generally Stith & Koh, supra note 18 (discussing the politics leading up to the 
SRA). 
 28. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 
Stat. 1976.  
 29. See Breyer, supra note 20, at 4; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra 
note 5, at 2 (“The 1984 Act sought to achieve ‘certainty and fairness’ in the 
federal sentencing process by eliminating ‘unwarranted disparity’ among sen-
tences for similar defendants committing similar offenses.”).  
 30. Breyer, supra note 20, at 4. 
 31. See Sentencing Reform Act § 3624. 
 32. See Breyer, supra note 20, at 4. 
 33. See Sentencing Reform Act § 3742. 
 34. See Sentencing Reform Act § 991. 
 35. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 2. 
 36. Id. at 1. 
 37. See Gardina, supra note 6, at 357. The nature of the offense is deter-
mined by taking the base level offense and adding or subtracting levels based 
on predetermined factors. See id. The defendant’s criminal history is also ad-
justed according to predetermined factors. See id. 
 38. Id. 
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lar crime.39 Until 2005, when the Supreme Court decided Unit-
ed States v. Booker,40 the Guidelines effectively left the judge 
little or no power to sentence outside of this predetermined 
range.41 The courts began hearing challenges to the constitu-
tionality of this novel system almost immediately.42 
C. JUDICIAL APPROACH TO SENTENCING 
This Section details the Supreme Court’s sentencing juri-
sprudence. It describes the cases prior to the enactment of the 
Guidelines and highlights the development of the individual 
rights analysis. It then discusses the cases that, either directly 
or indirectly, affected the Guidelines as well as the analysis 
used to decide the cases. This Section focuses on the Court’s use 
of the individual rights provisions of the Sixth Amendment as 
the core constitutional challenge and method of analysis relat-
ing to the Guidelines. 
1. Pre-Guidelines Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence traces back 
to In re Winship.43 The narrow issue presented was whether 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required when adjudicat-
ing juvenile cases.44 The Court emphatically concluded that, 
whether juvenile or adult, the Due Process Clause requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt for every element of the crime 
charged.45 Despite the simplicity of the Court’s command, this 
case touched off a barrage of legislative and judicial activity at-
tempting to define not only what constitutes an element of a 
 
 39. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1A1.1, 1B1.6 (2007) 
(describing the authority under which the Guidelines are set forth and the or-
ganization and structure of the Guidelines). 
 40. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 41. See Gardina, supra note 6, at 357. 
 42. See Stith & Koh, supra note 18, at 281 (“Since they were promulgated 
in 1987, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been the subject of consider-
able attention, receiving little praise and much criticism from the legal com-
munity.”). 
 43. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
 44. Id. at 359. 
 45. Id. at 364 (“Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional sta-
ture of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process 
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he 
is charged.”). 
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crime, but also which branch of government has the power to 
provide such a definition.46 
Mullaney v. Wilbur47 was the Court’s first attempt at deal-
ing with the issues raised in the wake of In re Winship. It indi-
cated that the Court was unwilling to allow state legislatures to 
circumvent In re Winship.48 The issue presented was whether 
Maine could utilize a rebuttable presumption of malice afore-
thought in cases where intentional, unlawful killing had been 
proven.49 Relying on In re Winship, the Court held that, be-
cause malice aforethought was a defined element of the crime 
of murder, Maine could not shift the burden of proof to the de-
fendant.50 Instead, as in In re Winship, the Due Process Clause 
required Maine to prove malice aforethought beyond a reason-
able doubt.51 
Beginning with In re Winship and Mullaney, the pendulum 
of criminal sentencing power rested squarely on the side of jury 
adjudication and judicial sentencing discretion.52 As a result of 
the societal and political issues during the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the pendulum quickly swung toward legislative inter-
vention in all aspects of the criminal process.53 Patterson v. 
New York54 and McMillan v. Pennsylvania55 demonstrated how 
firmly entrenched the legislature was in all aspects of the crim-
inal process.56  
In Patterson, the Court dealt with a statute nearly identic-
al to the one at issue in Mullaney.57 The only difference was 
 
 46. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 83–87 (1986) (distinguish-
ing between sentencing factors and elements); Patterson v. New York, 432 
U.S. 197, 208–211 (1977) (discussing the need for certain elements in common 
law crimes); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692–704 (1975) (discussing the 
use of presumptions in elements). 
 47. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
 48. See id. at 698. 
 49. Id. at 684–87. 
 50. Id. at 704. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 403 (discussing the system of broad 
judicial discretion in place prior to Patterson v. New York).  
 53. See id. at 413 (“[U]nfettered judicial sentencing discretion gave way to 
a variety of legislatively imposed reviewable sentencing requirements . . . .”). 
 54. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
 55. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 56. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 413 (describing McMillan as a triumph 
of the legislature over the judiciary for control of the sentencing process). 
 57. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 198 (describing the New York murder sta-
tute as including only two elements—the intent to cause the death of another 
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New York’s decision to remove malice aforethought from the 
definition of murder, yet allow it as an affirmative defense.58 
Unlike Mullaney, the Court upheld the conviction under New 
York’s statute.59 Since malice aforethought was not an element 
of the crime, the Court reasoned, In re Winship’s holding was 
satisfied.60 In a dissent that foreshadowed Apprendi v. New 
Jersey,61 Justice Lewis Powell argued that the Court ignored 
the underlying issue by allowing the legislature to undefine 
crimes and circumvent the due process requirements of In re 
Winship.62  
Despite the seismic shift of power recognized in Patterson, 
the constitutional issues at play were due process and the Sixth 
Amendment. It was a matter of how the legislature defined 
crimes and the implications of that decision for the rights of in-
dividual defendants. It did not implicate the separation of pow-
ers because the legislature had not yet co-opted the judge’s 
power to determine an individual sentence.63  
McMillan v. Pennsylvania64 completed the shift towards 
legislative power. The case involved a challenge to a Pennsyl-
vania statute that required the mandatory imposition of a five-
year minimum sentence if the sentencing judge concluded, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the crime was committed 
while visibly possessing a firearm.65 Visible possession of a 
firearm was not a statutorily defined element of the underlying 
crime but, rather, a fact to be determined at sentencing accord-
ing to an independent statute.66 Relying on the logic of Patter-
 
person, and actually causing the death of another person—and not including 
malice aforethought as an element). 
 58. Id. at 212–13 (distinguishing Maine’s murder statute from the one at 
issue in Patterson by showing that Maine’s statute defined murder as unlaw-
ful killing with malice aforethought). 
 59. Id. at 216. 
 60. Id. at 215–16. 
 61. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 62. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 228 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The Win-
ship/Mullaney test indentifies those factors of such importance, historically, in 
determining punishment and stigma that the Constitution forbids shifting to 
the defendant the burden of persuasion when such a factor is at issue.”). 
 63. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 411 (“This broad legislative power to 
define crimes was counterbalanced by broad judicial sentencing  
discretion . . . .”). 
 64. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 65. Id. at 83. 
 66. See id. at 81. The Pennsylvania statute at issue was a sentencing sta-
tute dealing with crimes committed while in possession of a firearm. It pro-
vided (at the time McMillan was decided), in effect, that certain felonies, de-
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son, the Court concluded that visibly possessing a firearm was 
a “sentencing factor,” and as such, the sentence did not violate 
the due process requirements of In re Winship.67 The distinc-
tion between an element of a crime and a “sentencing factor” 
was premised on the notion that the firearm provision did not 
increase the statutorily determined punishment range, but ra-
ther limited the sentencing judge’s discretion within that statu-
tory range by imposing a minimum sentence.68 
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that there 
must be a meaningful distinction between aggravating and mi-
tigating factors.69 Based on that distinction, Pennsylvania’s 
statute was unconstitutional because it allowed an unproven 
fact to aggravate the sentence.70 As a counterpoint, the legisla-
ture could define crimes extremely broadly but allow the defen-
dant to prove mitigating factors, similar to Patterson.71 
The Court focused exclusively on individual rights rather 
than structural concerns.72 In re Winship’s individual rights 
concerns were satisfied because the Court concluded that the 
firearms provision was a sentencing factor rather than an ele-
ment of the crime.73 The Court remained silent on the separa-
tion of powers issue because it was not raised as part of the 
challenge. Despite McMillan’s individual rights focus, the first 
challenge to the Guidelines nevertheless dealt with the separa-
tion of powers. 
 
fined in other sections of the Code, were punishable by a minimum of five 
years in prison if committed while in possession of a firearm. 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 9712 (1982). The statutes defining the crimes made no mention of the 
mandatory minimum sentences. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85–86. The fact 
that the defendant possessed a firearm was not proven to the jury. See id. at 
82. 
 67. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86 (“While visible possession might well have 
been included as an element of the enumerated offenses . . . Patterson teaches 
that we should hesitate to conclude that Due Process bars the State from pur-
suing its chosen course in the area of defining crimes . . . .”). 
 68. Id. at 87–88. 
 69. Id. at 100 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. at 103–04. 
 71. Id. at 99. 
 72. See id. at 90 (majority opinion) (discussing the due process require-
ments and concluding that due process does not require certain facts to be 
proved simply because many states require such proof ). 
 73. See id. at 87–88 (“Section 9712 neither alters the maximum penalty 
for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate 
penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court’s discretion in selecting 
a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of 
visible possession of a firearm.” (emphasis added)). 
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2. Judicial Interpretation of the Guidelines 
In 1989, the Court decided Mistretta v. United States,74 the 
first challenge to the validity of the Guidelines. The questions 
presented were whether Congress’s delegation of power to the 
Commission was excessive, and whether the creation of the 
Commission violated the separation of powers doctrine.75 The 
Court answered both questions negatively and upheld the dele-
gation of power.76 Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a scathing lone 
dissent, arguing that the Commission—comprised of members 
of the executive and judicial branches—was exercising legisla-
tive power by effectively defining crimes.77 Mistretta was the 
only time that the Court has been faced with a separation of 
powers challenge to the Guidelines.78 The Court looked only at 
the alleged judicial involvement in legislating instead of deal-
ing with the issue broadly. It did not address the legislature’s 
involvement in individual sentencing. 
Having decided the delegation and separation of powers is-
sues in Mistretta, the Court returned to the individual rights 
analysis developed from In re Winship to McMillan. Jones v. 
United States79 foreshadowed the application of that analysis to 
the Guidelines. The Court’s decisions in Jones and Apprendi v. 
New Jersey80 signaled that the judicial branch was finally will-
ing to push back against the legislative encroachment that be-
came entrenched in Patterson and McMillan.81 
A federal car-jacking statute was at issue in Jones.82 The 
narrow question presented was one of statutory interpreta-
tion—whether the statute “defined three distinct offenses or a 
 
 74. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 75. Id. at 371–72; see also Mark Nielsen, Mistretta v. United States and 
the Eroding Separation of Powers, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1049, 1049 
(1989). 
 76. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 412. 
 77. Id. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the Commission as a “ju-
nior-varsity Congress”). Justice Scalia argued that the Commission violated 
the separation of powers because it was exercising legislative power. Id. at 
426–27. 
 78. Cf. Nielsen, supra note 75, at 1055 (“The Court viewed Mistretta’s se-
paration-of-powers claim as containing three distinct arguments—the first 
emphasizing the Commission’s location, the second its composition, and the 
third its potential vulnerability to executive control.”). 
 79. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).  
 80. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 81. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 426–27 (arguing that Jones and Ap-
prendi signaled a move back towards the Mullaney framework).  
 82. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229. 
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single crime with a choice of three maximum penalties, two of 
them dependent on sentencing factors exempt from the re-
quirements of charge and jury verdict.”83 Justice David Sou-
ter—joined by Justices Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, and Stevens—concluded that the former was the 
proper interpretation.84  
The relevant aspect of Jones, however, was not the holding 
of the case but, rather, the reasoning Justice Souter used to 
reach that decision. He argued that the latter interpretation 
would raise serious Sixth Amendment and due process con-
cerns.85 Relying on the analysis stemming from In re Winship, 
Justice Souter argued that removing facts that increase pun-
ishment from the jury’s consideration is inconsistent with the 
Sixth Amendment and due process.86 In the wake of Patterson 
and McMillan, Jones breathed new life into the Sixth Amend-
ment and Due Process Clause arguments as they related to the 
Guidelines.87  
Similar to Jones, the Court’s decision in Apprendi was im-
portant to the Guidelines but did not deal with them directly. 
At issue was a due process claim arising out of a sentence un-
der a New Jersey hate crimes statute.88 The question presented 
was whether a judge—sitting without a jury at sentencing—
could impose a sentence above the maximum allowed on the 
jury’s findings, based on evidence proved by preponderance at 
sentencing.89 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated 
that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”90  
The analytical framework that emerged from Jones and 
Apprendi focused exclusively on the individual rights of the ac-
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. at 244 (“It is therefore no trivial question to ask whether re-
cognizing an unlimited legislative power to authorize determinations setting 
ultimate sentencing limits without a jury would invite erosion of the jury’s 
function to a point against which a line must necessarily be drawn.”). 
 86. Id. at 248 (“The point is simply that diminishment of the jury’s signi-
ficance by removing control over facts determining a statutory sentencing 
range would resonate with the claims of earlier controversies, to raise a gen-
uine Sixth Amendment issue not yet settled.”).  
 87. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 426–27 (arguing that Jones signaled a 
return to the individual rights model of Mullaney). 
 88. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468–69 (2000). 
 89. Id. at 469. 
 90. Id. at 490. 
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cused.91 That framework developed as the standard constitu-
tional challenge to sentences under the Guidelines.92 The sepa-
ration of powers issue was brushed under the rug because the 
Court rolled out the red carpet for the Sixth Amendment chal-
lenge.93 There was no apparent need to address the separation 
of powers in the context of the Guidelines because the Court 
had not addressed it in the prior decisions other than Mistret-
ta.94 
Blakely v. Washington95 was the final link between the 
Court’s individual rights analysis and the Guidelines. The de-
fendant directly challenged the constitutionality of Washing-
ton’s sentencing guidelines under the Sixth Amendment.96 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the applica-
tion of Washington’s guidelines—which were substantially the 
same as the Federal Guidelines—was unconstitutional under 
the Sixth Amendment when used to sentence a defendant to a 
longer prison term than would have been allowed based on the 
evidence heard by the jury.97  
In United States v. Booker,98 the Court finally tackled the 
ostensible conflict between the Guidelines and Apprendi. The 
case was a direct challenge to the constitutionality of the 
Guidelines when used to impose a sentence above the statutory 
maximum based solely on the facts found by the jury at trial.99 
What appeared on its face to be a simple application of Blakely 
ended up as a compromise decision, resulting in two separate 
majority opinions as well as four separate dissenting opi-
nions.100 The constitutional majority101 held that Blakely’s rea-
 
 91. See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 989, 1042–43 (2006) (arguing that the Court focused solely on 
the defendant’s individual rights instead of the Guidelines’ structural prob-
lems). 
 92. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007); United States 
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005). 
 93. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042–43. 
 94. See id. at 1041–43. 
 95. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 96. Id. at 301. 
 97. Id. at 313. 
 98. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 99. See id. at 226 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part) 
(“The question presented in each of these cases is whether an application of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 100. See id. at 225. 
 101. Of the two majority opinions, the first, written by Justice Stevens and 
joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, concluded that the 
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soning also applies to the Federal Guidelines.102 The remedial 
majority,103 however, held that, in light of the constitutional 
majority’s decision, the appropriate remedy was to excise those 
provisions of the SRA that have the effect of making the Guide-
lines mandatory.104 
The result left the Guidelines in limbo. They were no long-
er mandatory, but the remedial majority articulated that sen-
tencing judges were still required to take them into considera-
tion.105 Sentencing judges must now go through a two-step 
process to determine the appropriate sentence.106 Calculating 
the appropriate Guidelines sentence is the first step.107 Next, 
the judge decides whether that sentence is reasonable in light 
of the considerations set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).108 This 
determination of reasonableness became the next point of con-
flict for the courts. A circuit split developed over whether it was 
appropriate to accord a presumption of reasonableness to sen-
tences that fell within the appropriate Guidelines range.109 
The Supreme Court took up that question in Rita v. United 
States.110 Rita was the Court’s first decision on the Guidelines 
since the upheaval of Booker. It held that a federal appellate 
court “may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district 
court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentenc-
 
Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Blakely and Apprendi did apply to the 
Guidelines. See id. at 226–27. This will be referred to as the “constitutional 
majority” to avoid confusion with the second majority opinion. 
 102. Id. 
 103. The second majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer and joined by 
Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, O’Connor, and Ginsburg, decided the appropri-
ate remedy for the constitutional violation. See id. at 245 (Breyer, J., deliver-
ing the opinion of the Court in part). This will be referred to as the “remedial 
majority.” 
 104. Id. at 245. 
 105. See id. at 264. 
 106. 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 526.1 (3d ed. 2004). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Compare United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2006) (ac-
cepting the position that sentences that are properly calculated and fall within 
the Guidelines’ range are presumed to be reasonable), and United States v. 
Lewis, 436 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2006) (same), with United States v. Fernandez, 
443 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2006) (taking the position that sentences that fall within 
the Guidelines range are not presumed to be reasonable), and United States v. 
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2006) (same). 
 110. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007). 
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ing Guidelines.”111 As a corollary, it held that this presumption 
does not violate the Sixth Amendment as it has been inter-
preted in Apprendi and Booker.112 Again, the Court was silent 
on the separation of powers. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring 
opinion but took issue with the majority’s opinion.113 “The 
Court,” Justice Scalia wrote, “has reintroduced the constitu-
tional defect that Booker purported to eliminate.”114 According 
to Justice Scalia, the perception of which branch of the gov-
ernment controls individual sentences is the only difference be-
tween the pre-Booker system and the post-Rita system.115  
Rita dealt only with appellate review of sentences falling 
within the applicable Guidelines range.116 Most recently, in 
Gall v. United States117 and Kimbrough v. United States,118 the 
Court addressed the contentious issue of “reasonableness” re-
view for sentences that deviated from the applicable Guidelines 
range.119 It held that appellate courts could not require a show-
ing of “extraordinary” circumstances to justify a deviation from 
the Guidelines range.120 Although both Justice Ginsburg, in 
Kimbrough, and Justice Stevens, in Gall, took pains to reaffirm 
the advisory nature of the Guidelines post-Booker,121 they were 
steadfast in asserting that the Guidelines remain the default 
for individual sentences.122 The Court said that the Guidelines 
 
 111. Id. at 2462. 
 112. Id. at 2467. 
 113. See id. at 2474 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 114. Id. at 2476. 
 115. See id. (“If a sentencing system is permissible in which some sentences 
cannot lawfully be imposed by a judge unless the judge finds certain facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence, then we should have left in place the compul-
sory Guidelines that Congress enacted, instead of imposing this jerry-rigged 
scheme of our own.”). 
 116. See id. at 2463 (Breyer, J., majority opinion). 
 117. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007). 
 118. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007). 
 119. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 591; Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564. 
 120. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595 (“We reject, however, an appellate rule that 
requires ‘extraordinary’ circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guide-
lines range.”). 
 121. See id. at 594; Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564 (“We hold that, under 
Booker, the cocaine Guidelines, like all other Guidelines, are advisory 
only . . . .”). 
 122. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594 (“It is also clear that a district judge must 
give serious consideration to the extent of any departure from the Guidelines 
and must explain his conclusion that an unusually lenient or an unusually 
harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient justifica-
tions.”); Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574. 
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are the baseline for sentencing, but a district judge may, after 
“serious consideration,” vary from the structure if it is “reason-
able” in the case at bar.123  
With the exception of Mistretta, the Supreme Court’s 
Guidelines jurisprudence focuses exclusively on the individual 
rights concerns of the Sixth Amendment and Due Process 
Clause.124 This is likely a result of inertia from the pre-
Guidelines cases such as Jones and Apprendi. Although that 
analysis is necessary when dealing with the Guidelines, it is 
not sufficient.125 The Guidelines present structural problems 
that are not adequately resolved by the individual rights analy-
sis. By relying exclusively on the individual rights analysis, the 
Court has created a blind spot in its sentencing jurisprudence 
and fashioned incomplete remedies as a result. 
II.  THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE AND THE 
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES   
The Supreme Court’s individual rights focus has come at 
the expense of the Guidelines’ structural infirmity—the separa-
tion of powers.126 In the context of the criminal process, the in-
dividual rights provisions of the Sixth Amendment, the Due 
Process Clause, and the structural concerns of the separation of 
powers are two sides of the same coin.127 The Guidelines cases 
are unsatisfying because the Court is only dealing with one side 
of the coin.128 Although addressing different symptoms, both 
 
 123. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596 (“As a matter of administration and to se-
cure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and 
the initial benchmark.”); Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574 (“As explained in Rita 
and Gall, district courts must treat the Guidelines as the ‘starting point and 
initial benchmark.’”). 
 124. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007); United States 
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005). 
 125. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042–43 (stating that the separation of 
powers analysis is a necessary corollary to the individual rights analysis). 
 126. See id. at 1042. (“[I]ts failure to focus on the separation of powers and 
the structural check provided by the jury led it to miss the real problem with 
the Guidelines . . . .”). 
 127. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (arguing that the framers believed that individual rights and 
the separation of powers were so intertwined that a Bill of Rights was unne-
cessary given the structural protections of the Constitution itself ); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 546–51 (arguing 
that no Bill of Rights is necessary to protect the liberty of the individual and, 
in fact, that such a bill would weaken the rights protected by the structure of 
the Constitution). 
 128. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1012–16 (arguing that both procedural 
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are attacking the same problem—governmental tyranny—from 
different perspectives.129 The individual rights protections—
without the structural counterparts—are insufficient.130 Until 
the Court deals with the structural concern, it will never fully 
resolve the constitutional infirmities that have been haunting 
the Guidelines. 
A. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURE 
This Section provides an overview of separation of powers 
theory. It begins with a discussion of the framers’ motivations 
and understanding. It then describes the structural safeguards 
that the framers included in the Constitution and analyzes the 
Court’s enforcement of those safeguards in the criminal con-
text. It argues that while the Court’s sentencing cases have de-
fined and protected the structural roles of the legislature and 
jury, they have failed to offer parallel safeguards for the struc-
tural role of the judiciary. 
1. Rationale: The Framers’ Mistrust of Aggregated Power 
A “profound mistrust of government” and a fear of tyranny 
that arises from the aggregation of power lay at the heart of 
any theory of separation of powers.131 According to the framers, 
the separation of powers is second in importance only to the 
ability of government to control the governed.132 They recog-
nized that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, execu-
tive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or 
many . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of ty-
ranny.”133 James Madison equated tyranny with the mere ac-
cumulation of excess power.134 The separation of powers was a 
 
and structural constitutional safeguards were intended as checks on govern-
mental abuse). 
 129. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 546–
51. 
 130. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 450–51 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Barkow, 
supra note 91, at 1034 (“The individual rights perspective misses these struc-
tural concerns and cannot bear the weight of policing the inequalities that the 
separation of powers is designed to address.”). 
 131. Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 456–57. “If men were angels,” wrote 
James Madison, “no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern 
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be neces-
sary.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 331. 
 132. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 331. 
 133. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 307–08. 
 134. Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 464.  
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doctrine of prevention; the goal was to avoid accumulation of 
power before it occurred.135 
The framers imposed a structure with three distinct 
branches as a means of avoiding tyranny.136 The division of 
power between the three branches was a “prophylactic” to pre-
vent any one branch from acquiring sufficient power to “subvert 
popular sovereignty and individual liberty.”137 Although the ul-
timate end is the protection of individual liberty, the doctrine of 
separation of powers is an internal structural check on accumu-
lation of power.138  
2. Structure: The Separation of Powers Inherent in the 
Constitution 
The framers recognized that the criminal process is partic-
ularly ripe for abuses and carefully crafted a system to minim-
ize that possibility.139 Within the criminal process, power is di-
vided between the legislature, the executive, the jury, and the 
judge.140 The role of the legislature is to define criminal activi-
 
 135. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 121 (Wil-
liam Peden ed., Univ. of N.C. Press 1982) (1787) (“The time to guard against 
corruption and tyranny, is before they shall have gotten hold of us. It is better 
to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to trust to drawing his teeth and talons 
after he shall have entered.”). 
 136. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (describing “a vigorous 
Legislative Branch,” an “independent Executive Branch,” and an “equally in-
dependent” judicial branch). 
 137. Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 463. 
 138. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 860 
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Framers also understood that a princip-
al benefit of the separation of judicial power from the legislative and executive 
powers would be the protection of individual litigants from decisionmakers 
susceptible to majoritarian pressures.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander 
Hamilton), supra note 1, at 546–47, 550–51. 
 139. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (“The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Con-
vention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbi-
trary power.”); cf. Barkow, supra note 91, at 994 (“[A]s a matter of traditional 
constitutional interpretation, a strict separation of powers in criminal law 
matters has a stronger textual and historical pedigree than in other con-
texts.”). 
 140. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 307 
(“[T]he legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate 
and distinct.”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 81–104 (1998) 
(discussing the centrality of the jury in the criminal process); Barkow, supra 
note 91, at 1015–17 (discussing the role that each branch plays in the criminal 
process). Because the role of the executive branch is peripheral to this analy-
sis, it is not detailed here. Briefly, the role of the executive is to prosecute in-
dividuals who violate the statutes passed by Congress. See Redish & Cisar, 
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ty.141 Congress makes policy decisions regarding what conduct 
or activities ought to be proscribed by law.142 It then defines 
and proscribes that conduct in a statute.143 Along with the defi-
nition, the legislature articulates a range of acceptable sanc-
tions for violation of the statute.144  
Generally speaking, this was the approach prior to the ear-
ly 1980s.145 Since that time, Congress has attempted to exercise 
control over the sentences imposed on individual defendants.146 
This is inconsistent with the original understanding of separa-
tion of powers because the legislature exercises judicial power 
in violation of Articles I and III.147 The Apprendi line examined 
the boundaries of legislative power through the individual 
rights analysis. The implicit question was always whether the 
legislature had the power to take the action that it did.148 On 
the surface, the cases questioned whether the legislature’s ac-
tion violated the Sixth Amendment or due process rights of an 
 
supra note 6, at 480 (arguing that the existence of an executive power presup-
poses a law to be executed). 
 141. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 
(1812) (“The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, 
affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of 
the offence.”). 
 142. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 479 (“‘[L]egislative’ power in-
cludes only the authority to promulgate generalized standards and require-
ments of citizen behavior or to dispense benefits—to achieve, maintain, or 
avoid particular social policy results.”). 
 143. See id. 
 144. See NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE ET AL., SENTENCING, SANCTIONS, AND 
CORRECTIONS 81 (2d ed. 2002) (“The legislature exercises neither primary nor 
secondary responsibility in the sentencing process. Even so, the legislature 
does play an initial pivotal role in the sentencing process (a) by defining and 
proscribing certain activities as criminal, (b) by prescribing the corresponding 
sanctions, and (c) by establishing the sentencing structure and defining the 
roles of the actors.”). 
 145. See Douglas A. Berman, Foreward: Beyond Blakely and Booker: Pon-
dering Modern Sentencing Process, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 654–
55, 658–59 (2005). 
 146. See id. 
 147. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 310 
(“Were the power of judging joined with the legislature, the life and liberty of 
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be 
the legislator.”); Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 455 n.24 (“The separation of 
powers protections are, in fact, explicitly embodied in the text—in portions of 
Articles I, II, and III that convey to each branch a specific type of governmen-
tal power.”). 
 148. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476–77 (2000); McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 83–91 (1986); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 
198, 201–02, 210 (1977). 
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individual, but, as a consequence, they defined the structural 
role of the legislature.149  
The role of the jury is to adjudicate guilt based on the legis-
lative definitions.150 Under the framers’ structure, the jury de-
cides the guilt or innocence of the defendant.151 The question is 
whether the accused committed the act proscribed by the sta-
tute. If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the accused committed the act, he is found guilty and handed 
over to the judge to articulate an appropriate sanction.152  
The line of cases from In re Winship through Rita, with the 
exception of Mistretta, all focused on this discrete aspect of the 
structure.153 These cases entrenched the jury as a fundamental 
individual right in the criminal process.154 As a consequence, 
they also cemented the structural function of the jury.155 In de-
ciding the implicit question of whether the legislature’s action 
was a legitimate exercise of power, the Court focused of wheth-
er the action removed responsibility from the jury.156 Accor-
dingly, they delineated the structural role of the jury.  
The judge’s role is to sentence individuals who have been 
convicted by a jury based on his discretion and experience.157 If 
 
 149. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477–84 (implying that the legislature’s ac-
tions were not within its powers); McMillan, 477 U.S. at 83–91 (implying that 
the legislature had broad power to define the elements of crimes). 
 150. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1015 (“The Constitution therefore pro-
vides in Article III—the Article establishing the judicial role in government—
that the trial of all crimes must be by jury.”).  
 151. See id. (describing the jury’s unreviewable power to acquit). 
 152. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. 
REV. 733, 743–44 (1980). 
 153. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476–77; McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84–87; cf. In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359–64 (1970). 
 154. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230–33 (2005); Apprendi, 
530 U.S. at 476–78. 
 155. By requiring that all facts of consequence be proven to a jury, the cas-
es ensured that none of the other branches could usurp the jury’s role of adju-
dicating guilt. 
 156. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476–77, 490. 
 157. See id. at 481 (“[J]udges in this country have long exercised discretion 
of this nature in imposing sentence within statutory limits in the individual 
case.”); Schulhofer, supra note 152, at 743–44. Implicit in the traditional roles 
of juries and judges is a distinction between guilt and culpability. Cf. Weins-
tein, supra note 2, at 407–08 (discussing the distinction between guilt and cul-
pability in relation to the Court’s decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur). Guilt is de-
fined as having committed the acts proscribed in the statute. See STITH & 
CABRANES, supra note 5, at 22 (discussing the relationship between the adju-
dication of guilt and proof of the elements of a crime). Culpability is the 
blameworthiness of the defendant. See id. Juries decide whether the defen-
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a defendant is convicted by a jury of robbery, and, according to 
the legislature, robbery is punishable by anywhere from one to 
five years in prison, the judge is free to take into account any-
thing relevant to the defendant’s culpability in determining 
where, between one and five years, the sentence ought to fall. 
This allows the sentences to be tailored, not only to the crime, 
but to the criminal as well.158 This discretion prevents the gov-
ernment from imposing unjust sentences because of mechanical 
legislative “diktats.”159  
The Court’s sentencing cases provide scant support for the 
judge’s function in the criminal context. Unlike the jury, the 
cases did not contemplate the judge as a fundamental aspect of 
the individual rights analysis.160 And unlike the legislature, the 
cases did not involve a challenge to judicial action.161 Accor-
dingly, the decisions did not provide the same protection for the 
structural role of the judiciary.162 
The framers’ separation of powers was a “self-executing  
safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one 
branch at the expense of the other.”163 For this system to work, 
each branch must be “entirely free from the control or coercive 
influence, direct or indirect . . . of the others.”164 That means, in 
the criminal arena, the judiciary must exercise its traditional 
 
dant’s actions conformed to the statutory definition. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 
477 (noting the jury’s role in determining whether a defendant is guilty of 
every statutory element of a crime). Judges, on the other hand, determined 
what the punishment should be, within the statutory range, based on an in-
terpretation of the defendant’s culpability. See id. at 482. Judges were en-
trusted with this responsibility because of their unique position allowing them 
to see all of the defendants coming through the system and to compare their 
actions.  
 158. See Gertner, supra note 21, at 528–29 (“Disparity inheres in any sys-
tem that seeks to provide proportional punishment, that tailors the punish-
ment to fit, not just the crime, but the criminal, and that purports to be a na-
tional system.”). 
 159. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 14, 22, 30. 
 160. Cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476–80 (focusing on the jury’s role in pro-
tecting individual rights). 
 161. Cf. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 83–91 (1986) (arguing that 
the legislature’s action did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment or 
due process rights).  
 162. Again, the Apprendi line focused on the interplay between the legisla-
tures and the juries. Although the framework used was individual rights, the 
result was an understanding of those branches roles in relation to one another. 
Because the judge was not part of the framework, his role eluded description 
and protection.  
 163. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976). 
 164. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). 
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role—sentencing—independently of the legislature in order to 
maintain the integrity of the constitutional structure and pre-
vent the tyranny at which the structure was aimed.165 The 
Court’s jurisprudence has failed to protect the judiciary’s role 
from legislative encroachment. 
B. THE GUIDELINES AS A VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS 
The Guidelines are a violation of the structure crafted by 
the framers and laid out in the Constitution.166 They are a leg-
islative effort to exert control over individual sentences, rather 
than define crimes and general sentencing ranges.167 The legis-
lature usurps judicial power by removing the traditional discre-
tion afforded to sentencing judges and replacing it with minis-
terial duties.168 Keeping in mind the traditional roles discussed 
above, Justice William Rehnquist’s statement in McMillan, 
that the law “operates solely to limit the sentencing court’s dis-
cretion in selecting a penalty within the range,”169 is evidence 
of the separation of powers violation inherent in this type of 
legislation.170 The solitary role of the sentencing judge in the 
criminal process is to exercise his discretion and determine in-
dividual sentences.171 Insofar as the Guidelines remove that 
discretion, they are a violation of the separation of powers.172 
 
 165. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 860 
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The federal judicial power, then, must be 
exercised by judges who are independent of the Executive and the Legislature 
in order to maintain the checks and balances that are crucial to our constitu-
tional structure.”). 
 166. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042 (“The Guidelines therefore take 
constitutional power away from the judiciary, thereby increasing the power of 
Congress and the executive.”). 
 167. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1946 (1988) (dis-
cussing the Commission’s role as creating a system of guidelines that took into 
account all relevant aspects in sentencing an individual). 
 168. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042 (arguing that the SRA transferred 
power away from the judicial branch and towards the legislative branch). 
 169. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986). 
 170. Granted, the statute in McMillan was not part of the Guidelines. But 
the mandatory minimums discussed there have the same constitutional prob-
lems as the Guidelines.  
 171. See Schulhofer, supra note 152, at 743–44. 
 172. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 309 
(“[W]here the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands 
which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental prin-
ciples of a free constitution are subverted.”); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, 
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1. Separation of Powers and the Pre-Booker Guidelines 
The Guidelines prior to Booker presented the same separa-
tion of power problem that was implicit in the statutory provi-
sions in Jones and Apprendi.173 In both Jones and Apprendi, 
the legislatures attempted to use “sentencing factors” to limit 
judicial discretion in individual sentencing, rather than to de-
fine the elements of a crime.174 In Jones, the Court avoided the 
structural issue by interpreting the statute to define multiple 
crimes with distinguishing elements that must be proven to a 
jury.175 This resolved any potential separation of powers con-
flict by interpreting the legislature’s act as a definition of three 
separate crimes with more narrow sentencing ranges, rather 
than one crime with limitations on judicial sentencing discre-
tion. The separation of powers is not offended as long as Con-
gress defines a crime and prescribes a range based on the ele-
ments of that crime, instead of defining facts, not proven to a 
jury, that limit judicial discretion within that range. 
In Apprendi, the Court took a slightly different approach. 
The Court effectively left New Jersey with two options: it could 
either stop applying the hate crimes statute at sentencing, or it 
could prove the elements of that statute to the jury.176 If the 
state chose the former, there is no constitutional problem be-
cause the sentence would be based only on the elements proven 
to the jury. If the state chose the latter, similar to Jones, the 
application of the hate crimes statute would create a new sta-
tute, the elements of which must be proven to a jury.177 In ei-
 
at 82 (“The federal Sentencing Guidelines . . . seek not to augment but to re-
place the knowledge and experience of judges.”). 
 173. Compare United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005), and 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299–301 (2004), with Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496–97 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 
232, 252 (1999). 
 174. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468–71; Jones, 526 U.S. at 230–32. 
 175. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 251–52 (“In sum, the Government’s view would 
raise serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive. 
Any doubt on the issue of statutory construction is hence to be resolved in fa-
vor of avoiding those questions. This is done by construing § 2119 as establish-
ing three separate offenses by the specification of distinct elements . . . .”). 
 176. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490–92, 497 (holding that the procedure 
challenged in the case is unacceptable, but not mandating a particular reme-
dy). 
 177. Because the underlying crime in Apprendi was unlawful possession of 
a firearm, the new crime would be aggravated unlawful possession of a fire-
arm. The elements of the aggravated crime, which must be proven to a jury, 
would include all of the elements of the hate crime statute. This would be 
comparable to the distinction between grand and petit larceny, all elements of 
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ther option, returning the legislature back to its constitutional 
role and removing it from individual sentencing resolves the 
separation of powers issue.178 
The mandatory Guidelines system in place prior to Booker 
contained the same separation of powers problem. Functioning 
as an independent statute, the Guidelines limited judicial dis-
cretion within statutory ranges rather than defining elements 
of a crime.179 The legislature commanded the sentencing judge 
to prescribe a particular sentence for a particular defendant 
based on facts not defined as elements of the underlying 
crime.180 This was a legislative exercise of judicial power; pre-
cisely the aggrandizement that the separation of powers was 
intended to prevent.181 
To be clear, this is a distinct separation of powers problem 
than the one addressed in Mistretta.182 There, the Court consi-
dered whether Congress’s delegation to the Commission empo-
wered the judicial or executive branch to exercise legislative 
power.183 The more pertinent question now—consistent with 
the framers’ separation of powers concerns—is whether the 
Guidelines allow Congress to exercise judicial power.184 The 
 
which would have to be proven to a jury. See id. at 501 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (“Thus, if the legislature defines some core crime and then provides for 
increasing the punishment of that crime upon a finding of some aggravating 
fact . . . the core crime and the aggravating fact together constitute an aggra-
vated crime, just as grand larceny is an aggravated form of petit larceny.”). 
 178. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 479 (describing the legislature’s 
role as “promulgat[ing] generalized standards and requirements of citizen be-
havior”). 
 179. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: 
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1697 
(1992) (“Guidelines are administrative handcuffs that are applied to judges 
and no one else.”). 
 180. See id. at 1696 (“The judge sentences ‘by the book.’ He imposes sen-
tences in the traditional manner, after following the guidelines and making 
pivotal determinations of fact.” (emphasis added)). 
 181. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 316 
(“The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activi-
ty, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”); Redish & Cisar, supra 
note 6, at 465 (“Each branch is limited to the exercise of the power given to it, 
which, in turn, is exclusive of the power exercised by the other 
branches . . . .”). 
 182. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380–85 (1989) (discussing 
the separation of powers in regard to Congress’s delegation of authority to the 
Commission, not in terms of the Commission’s exercise of that authority). 
 183. See id. 
 184. The framers were more concerned with aggrandizement of power by 
the legislature than by the other branches. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 
(James Madison), supra note 1, at 317 (“[The legislative department’s] consti-
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questions are mutually exclusive. It is perfectly consistent to 
uphold Mistretta’s conclusion—that Congress’s delegation to 
the Commission does not violate the separation of powers—
while, at the same time, arguing that the Commission’s Guide-
lines are in violation.185 In other words, the creation of the 
Commission itself is not problematic but that the way in which 
the Commission exercised the power granted to it by Congress is 
problematic. The Court did not consider this distinction be-
cause Booker adopted the individual rights framework from the 
Apprendi line.186 As a result, it did not discuss whether the re-
medy would implicitly resolve the structural issue in the same 
way as the Jones and Apprendi remedies.187  
2. Separation of Powers and Post-Booker Sentencing 
The Booker problem was the legislature’s imposition of a 
sentencing system that is independent of the crimes tried in 
front of juries.188 This, akin to the Apprendi line, presents both 
individual rights and structural problems.189 The legislature 
implemented a system that divested judges of the discretion to 
sentence within the statutory ranges and exerted control over 
individual sentences. The Booker remedy—severing the manda-
tory nature of the Guidelines—does not resolve the separation 
of powers problem.190 The remedial majority’s decision lacks 
the implicit structural resolution of the Jones and Apprendi so-
lutions.191 Justice Breyer focused exclusively on individual 
 
tutional powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise 
limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask . . . the encroachments which it 
makes on the coördinate departments.”). 
 185. It is necessary to recognize the distinction between Congress’s grant of 
authority to the Commission and the way in which the Commission exercised 
that authority. The former is a question of the judicial exercise of legislative 
power while the latter questions the legislative exercise of judicial power. 
 186. Cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005) (dealing only 
with the Sixth Amendment implications). 
 187. Cf. id. at 245–49 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in 
part) (comparing the relative merits of different remedies in terms of congres-
sional intent and individual rights but not explicitly addressing structural 
concerns). 
 188. Cf. id. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in 
part). 
 189. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042–43 (arguing that the individual 
rights analysis ignored the structural problems). 
 190. See id. (arguing that the Court’s focus on individual rights has caused 
it to miss the structural problem underlying the Guidelines). 
 191. Compare Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of 
the Court in part) (severing the mandatory nature of the Guidelines but leav-
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rights and deference to Congress while he ignored the parallel 
separation of powers violation inherent within the Guide-
lines.192 Rather than accepting the previous successful mod-
els—Jones and Apprendi—the remedial majority opted to ex-
plore less “radical” constitutional solutions.193 The question 
then, is whether the less “radical” resolution is also less effec-
tive. 
Proponents of the Booker decision argue that the advisory 
Guidelines resolves the structural problem since judges are no 
longer forced to sentence in accordance with the narrow Guide-
lines ranges.194 In a very formalistic sense, that analysis is cor-
rect. It fails to take into account, however, a deeper under-
standing of the motivations behind the separation of powers.195 
The structural problem with the Guidelines was not that the 
legislature forced judges to sentence within narrower ranges; 
such sentencing can be constitutional so long as the legislature 
defined narrower crimes and attached narrower statutory 
ranges.196 Instead, the problem was that the legislature exerted 
control over the sentences given to individual defendants and 
limited judicial discretion by pressuring judges to sentence in a 
particular fashion.197 The advisory Guidelines retain those 
more subtle violations.198 After Booker, although Congress is 
defining crimes with broad sentencing ranges, it continues to 
exert pressure on judges to sentence within the Guidelines.199 
 
ing the system in place as advisory), with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 492, 497 (2000) (holding that sentences in accordance with the hate 
crimes statute were unconstitutional unless the elements of the hate crime 
were proven to a jury rather than a judge), and Jones v. United States, 526 
U.S. 227, 251–52 (1999) (interpreting a New Jersey statute as defining sepa-
rate crimes rather than sentencing factors that limit judicial discretion). 
 192. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245, 267–68 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion 
of the Court in part). 
 193. See id. at 247 (discussing which solution would be the least radical). 
 194. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 429–32 (suggesting that defining the 
Guidelines as nonmandatory may resolve the power struggle between the 
branches). 
 195. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–30 (1935) 
(discussing indirect, as well as direct, coercion as inconsistent with the separa-
tion of powers). 
 196. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 95–96 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977). 
 197. Cf. Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 465 (“Each branch is limited to 
the exercise of the power given to it, which, in turn, is exclusive of the power 
exercised by the other branches . . . .”). 
 198. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1043 (suggesting that the mandatory 
nature is only part of the larger problem—the expansion of legislative power). 
 199. See id. 
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Though not as overt as the mandatory Guidelines, the post-
Booker system is still a legislative attempt to control individual 
sentences and, as such, is a violation of the separation of pow-
ers.200 
3. Rita v. United States: Judicial Acquiescence and Legislative 
Coercion 
The post-Rita system was nothing more than judicial hide-
the-ball on separation of powers.201 The Court, as well as some 
commentators, argue that Booker and Rita were the final step 
in swinging the pendulum back towards the judiciary—in ef-
fect, resolving both the individual rights and structural prob-
lems.202 One scholar, for example, argued that the current cases 
are “Mullaney’s revenge” because they restored judicial discre-
tion to its pre-McMillan level.203 Justice Scalia’s dissent in Ri-
ta, however, makes clear that all that has actually changed 
since Mistretta is the perception of which branch controls indi-
vidual sentences.204 That perception is misleading. The Court’s 
decision in Rita simply put a gloss of judicial credence on a sys-
tem that has been a violation of the separation of powers since 
its inception.205 
Far from a complete solution, the Booker remedy at least 
resolved the formal separation of powers violation by eliminat-
ing mandatory compliance with the Guidelines.206 Rita reintro-
duced part of the formal problem that Booker resolved. The on-
ly distinction between the Guidelines after Rita and the 
Guidelines before Booker was which branch of government re-
 
 200. See id. 
 201. Cf. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2476 (2007) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (arguing that Rita reintroduces the “constitutional defect” that Booker 
was aimed at, but does so through judicial rather than legislative means). 
 202. See id. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I trust that those judges who 
had treated the Guidelines as virtually mandatory during the post-Booker in-
terregnum will now recognize that the Guidelines are truly advisory.”); Weins-
tein, supra note 2, at 409 (arguing that Booker was the final step in returning 
to the system supported in Mullaney).  
 203. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 409. 
 204. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2476 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
Court has reintroduced the problem that Booker purported to resolve, but did 
so under the guise of judicial authority). 
 205. Cf. id. (stating that the Court has effectively returned to the pre-
Booker problem, without addressing the separation of powers directly). 
 206. Cf. Weinstein, supra note 2, at 429–32 (suggesting that defining the 
Guidelines as nonmandatory may resolve the power struggle between the 
branches). 
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quires compliance.207 It is, however, a distinction without a dif-
ference.  
In Rita, the Court effectively mandated compliance with 
the Guidelines.208 Booker ’s structural implication made clear 
that Congress could not force the judiciary to conform to Con-
gress’s wishes on individual sentencing.209 Rita, on the other 
hand, indicated that the Court was willing to pressure the judi-
ciary to do just that.210 This is structural formalism gone awry. 
Not only is it inconsistent with the subtle understanding of the 
separation of powers discussed in relation to the Booker reme-
dy, it is a return to a more formal violation. 
After Booker, Congress could only indirectly control indi-
vidual sentencing through the advisory Guidelines. After Rita, 
Congress could directly control individual sentencing through 
judicially endorsed Guidelines. The Court was acquiescing to 
congressional involvement in individual sentencing and hand-
ing Congress almost complete control over the traditional role 
of the judiciary. This is wholly inconsistent with the framers’ 
understanding of the separation of powers.211 Sentencing 
judges were not free to exercise their discretion without con-
gressional interference simply because the Guidelines are not 
legislatively mandatory.212 Congress continued to exert a coer-
cive force over judicial discretion and individual sentencing.213 
So long as the Guidelines are in place, and allow sentences 
based on facts not proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, 
they will present a problem for the separation of powers.214 
 
 207. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2476 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 208. Although not saying it explicitly, the evidence indicates that lower 
courts have taken Rita as an endorsement of the Guidelines. See, e.g., United 
States v. Gammicchia, 498 F.3d 467, 468 (7th Cir. 2007). Judge Posner went 
so far as to indicate that appealing a within-Guidelines sentence could be con-
strued as frivolous. Id. The Court’s decision makes it much more likely that 
sentencing judges will comply with the Guidelines to avoid reversal or remand 
on appeal. 
 209. Cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005). 
 210. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463. 
 211. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 309 
(“[W]here the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands 
which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental prin-
ciples of a free constitution are subverted.”). 
 212. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259, 264 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of 
the Court in part) (commanding that sentencing judges continue to give 
weight to the Guidelines despite their advisory nature). 
 213. See id. 
 214. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 497 (2000). 
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4. Gall v. United States: A Step in the Right Direction? 
After Rita, many circuits took the Court’s endorsement of 
the Guidelines to heart and effectively made them mandatory, 
by way of appellate review, in all but the most extraordinary 
cases.215 Without question, Gall and Kimbrough are a step in 
the right direction. The focus of the opinions has moved from 
the Sixth Amendment concerns that dominated Booker and Ri-
ta, to the underlying issue of judicial discretion.216 Despite the 
glowing rhetoric endorsing judicial discretion,217 the Court 
failed to resolve the structural problem that persisted in the 
wake of Booker. Individual sentences are still tethered, albeit 
more loosely, to the Guidelines in violation of the separation of 
powers.  
Although the Court claims that the Guidelines are truly 
advisory,218 they retain an unacceptable coercive influence over 
the judiciary’s role at sentencing. Both the requirements placed 
on the sentencing judges as well as the presumptions on appeal 
are evidence of the continued coercive force of the Guidelines.  
Kimbrough and Gall each made clear that the Guidelines 
must remain the “baseline” or “starting point” for district 
judges in their sentencing analysis.219 Kimbrough is a perfect 
example. The Court upheld the variance from the Guidelines 
because the sentencing judge followed the proper analytical 
procedure.220 He calculated the appropriate Guidelines sen-
 
 215. See, e.g., United States v. Gammicchia, 498 F.3d 467, 468 (7th Cir. 
2007) (suggesting that a sentence within the Guidelines has a presumption of 
reasonableness and that the appeal in this case was “frivolous”). 
 216. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 605 (2007) (Alito, J., dissent-
ing) (“It is telling that the rules set out in the Court’s opinion in the present 
case have nothing to do with juries or factfinding and, indeed, that not one of 
the facts that bears on petitioner’s sentence is disputed. What is at issue, in-
stead, is the allocation of authority to decide issues of substantive sentencing 
policy, an issue on which the Sixth Amendment says absolutely nothing.”). 
 217. See id. at 596–97 (Stevens, J., majority opinion) (discussing the sen-
tencing judge’s role of weighing all the appropriate factors, not just the Guide-
lines, when imposing a sentence); Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 
570–75 (2007) (rejecting the prosecution’s argument that sentencing judges do 
not have discretion on the issue of 100-to-1 crack/cocaine disparity). 
 218. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594; Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 570. 
 219. See, e.g., Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596 (“As a matter of administration and to 
secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and 
the initial benchmark.”). 
 220. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574–75 (upholding the district court’s 
sentence because the judge followed the correct procedure in varying from the 
Guidelines). 
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tence and justified his deviation therefrom.221 This is an exam-
ple of both the progress that has been made and the steps that 
still remain to be taken. Justice Ginsburg recognized the insti-
tutional competence of the sentencing judge, and the judiciary 
as a whole, in matters of individual sentencing.222 The decision 
does not, however, give the sentencing judge the complete dis-
cretion contemplated in the framers’ separation of powers.223 
Although the Court makes clear that deviations from the 
Guidelines are acceptable, judicial discretion is still tethered to, 
and limited by, the Guidelines.224 This is a step forward, but is 
not the final step necessary to resolve the structural issue.  
The coercive influence of the Guidelines is also apparent on 
appeal. Although Gall and Kimbrough make clear that below-
Guidelines sentences do not have to be justified by extraordi-
nary circumstances,225 those sentences are not granted the pre-
sumption of reasonableness that Rita bestowed on within-
Guidelines sentences.226 This disparity is stark proof of the 
congressional thumb-pressing in favor of within-Guidelines 
sentences. Again, this is a congressional exercise of judicial 
power over individual sentences and is inconsistent with a 
meaningful separation of powers.227 
Despite some flowery rhetoric, neither Gall nor Kimbrough 
did anything beyond reaffirming the Court’s decision in Booker. 
The cases stated unequivocally that the Guidelines are truly 
advisory.228 But that is nothing more than a restatement of the 
remedial majority’s position from Booker.229 As a result, neither 
Gall nor Kimbrough resolved the more subtle separation of 
 
 221. See id. at 575–76. 
 222. See id. at 574–75 (arguing for deference to the decisions of district 
judges because of their particular “institutional strengths”). 
 223. Cf. id. at 574 (stressing the continued importance of the Guidelines as 
“benchmark[s]” that represent the compiled wisdom of the Commission). 
 224. See id. 
 225. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 595 (2007). 
 226. Compare Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007) (holding 
that circuits may apply a presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines 
sentences), with Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597 (rejecting a presumption of unreasona-
bleness for outside-Guidelines sentences, but failing to endorse the same pre-
sumption of reasonableness that Rita granted to within-Guidelines sentences). 
 227. Cf. Barkow, supra note 91, at 1043 (arguing that the mandatory na-
ture is only part of the larger problem—the expansion of legislative power); 
Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 465 (“Each branch is limited to the exercise of 
the power given to it, which, in turn, is exclusive of the power exercised by the 
other branches . . . .”). 
 228. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594; Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564. 
 229. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
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powers violations that persisted after Booker. To the Court’s 
credit, these cases did repudiate some of the formal separation 
of powers violations that certain circuits had endorsed in the 
wake of Rita. The Court made clear that neither the legislature 
nor the circuit courts could mandate compliance with the 
Guidelines. This, however, leaves the sentencing system in the 
same place that it was after Booker; Congress continues to ex-
ert pressure on judges to sentence within the Guidelines. 
Though not as overt as the mandatory Guidelines, the current 
system, like the post-Booker system, is still a legislative at-
tempt to control individual sentences and, as such, is a viola-
tion of the separation of powers. 
5. Necessity of Addressing the Separation of Powers 
The Court’s recent decisions—Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough—
show a recognition of the structural problem, but, rather than 
address the issue, the Court decided to use sleight of hand to 
jerry-rig a solution.230 Language in both Booker and Rita indi-
cates that the Justices are aware of the underlying structural 
problem.231 Unfortunately, the Court disregarded the separa-
tion of powers and attempted to use a narrow individual rights 
analysis to solve a broader problem.232 Assuming that the 
Court is aware of the issue, it is important to consider whether 
there is a compelling reason why it has chosen not to address 
the structural concerns.  
One possibility is that the Court considers the individual 
rights protections of the Bill of Rights sufficient protection 
against governmental tyranny.233 Over the last fifty years, the 
Court created a robust system for protecting defendants 
 
 230. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2476 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If a sentencing 
system is permissible in which some sentences cannot lawfully be imposed by 
a judge unless the judge finds certain facts by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, then we should have left in place the compulsory Guidelines that Con-
gress enacted, instead of imposing this jerry-rigged scheme of our own.”). 
 231. See id. at 2477 (“But there is a fundamental difference, one underpin-
ning our entire Apprendi jurisprudence, between facts that must be found in 
order for a sentence to be lawful, and facts that individual judges choose to 
make relevant to the exercise of their discretion.”). 
 232. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042–43. 
 233. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“In recent years, perhaps, we have come to think of liberty as 
defined by that word in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and as illumi-
nated by the other provisions of the Bill of Rights.”); Barkow, supra note 91, at 
1031–32 (discussing why the separation of powers is underenforced in the 
criminal arena). 
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through the Bill of Rights.234 As long as the system is function-
ing correctly, rigid enforcement of the separation of powers is 
superfluous because the individual rights provisions are ulti-
mately aimed at the same evil—government invasion of indi-
vidual liberty.235 Unfortunately, robust enforcement of the Bill 
of Rights does not render the separation of powers impotent.236 
The rights encoded in the Bill of Rights are judicial process 
rights. If the legislature is allowed to exercise judicial power, in 
violation of the separation of powers, there is no assurance that 
the judicial process rights would apply.237 Consequently, a vi-
olation of the separation of powers could result in individual 
rights violations that bypass the judicial process.238 The argu-
ment that the separation of powers is less important because of 
the Bill of Rights misunderstands the primacy of the separation 
of powers in the framers’ structure. 
Another possibility for why the Court has not addressed 
the structural concerns is that they have not been raised in the 
challenges. This is related to the first possibility. One conse-
quence of the Court’s robust individual rights analysis is that 
defendants came to rely on the Bill of Rights for their constitu-
tional challenges.239 All of the Guidelines challenges were 
based on the Sixth Amendment or Due Process Clause rather 
than separation of powers principles.240 Nevertheless, this does 
not relieve the Court of its duty to resolve constitutional infir-
mities. The Court recognizes the ability of appellate courts to 
raise issues that were not addressed by the parties sua 
 
 234. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1032. 
 235. See id. at 1031–32 (“[I]f the individual rights protections serve the 
same function as the [separation of powers] . . . there would not be the same 
need for greater enforcement of the separation of powers in the criminal are-
na.”). 
 236. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It would be a 
grave mistake, however, to think a Bill of Rights in Madison’s scheme then or 
in sound constitutional theory now renders separation of powers of lesser im-
portance.”). 
 237. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1033 (“[I]f the legislature were permit-
ted to adjudicate criminal matters, none of the protections that apply to Ar-
ticle III courts would apply, nor would the legislature be subject to the rules of 
judicial process.”). 
 238. See id. at 1033 (“[I]f Congress were allowed to have judicial powers, 
the protections associated with judicial process could be bypassed.”). 
 239. See id. at 1032. 
 240. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465–66 (2007); United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296, 298 (2004).  
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sponte.241 If there is ever a time when sua sponte decision mak-
ing is appropriate, it is when the structural integrity of the 
Constitution is at stake.  
A final possibility is that the Court is dodging the separa-
tion of powers to avoid revisiting Mistretta, which appears to be 
settled law. As discussed earlier, however, the Court can attend 
to the structural problems raised by the Guidelines without 
disrupting Mistretta. Mistretta did not address the separation 
of powers concern at issue here—the legislative exercise of judi-
cial power.242 And the structural concern at issue in Mistretta—
the executive and judicial exercise of legislative power—need 
not be addressed in this context. For that reason, the Court’s 
apprehension about addressing the separation of powers be-
cause of Mistretta is unfounded.  
Regardless of the rationale, the Court’s decision to focus 
solely on the individual rights protections created a cumber-
some system that does not fully resolve the constitutional prob-
lems.243 The Court is attempting to tweak a fundamentally 
flawed system rather than trashing a failed experiment and 
beginning anew. Although this measured, deferential approach 
may be effective, or even laudable, in certain situations, it is 
unacceptable when dealing with the criminal process. The 
criminal process is too vulnerable to abuse and tyranny to allow 
structural violations to persist.244 Congress, through the Guide-
lines, has stripped the judiciary of its role in the criminal 
process.245 The Court must step forward and reassert judicial 
control over sentencing. “[A] mere demarcation on parchment of 
the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a 
sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a 
tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the 
same hands.”246 
 
 241. See Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look 
at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 287 (2002) 
(citing U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439 
(1993)). 
 242. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380–85 (1989) (dealing 
with the delegation of legislative power to the Commission and the placement 
of the Commission in the judicial branch). 
 243. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1031–33, 1042–43. 
 244. See id. at 1031–34. 
 245. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 83 (“The judge’s prescribed 
role is largely limited to factual determinations and rudimentary arithmetic 
operations.”). 
 246. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 321. 
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III.  ALTERNATIVES TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES   
Booker and Rita proved the insufficiency of the individual 
rights analysis for dealing with the more fundamental separa-
tion of powers problems that underlie the Guidelines.247 This 
Part returns to the issue in Booker and evaluates the remedial 
options with an eye toward the separation of powers. It lists the 
five reasonable alternatives to the Guidelines and discusses 
their implications for separation of powers, concluding that on-
ly two resolve the structural problems inherent in the Guide-
lines. It then contrasts the remaining two solutions and con-
cludes that the differences between them are matters of public 
policy, rather than constitutional law. Finally, this Part pro-
poses that the critical decision between the remaining options 
ought to be left to Congress, as policymaking is a realm tradi-
tionally reserved to the legislature. 
A. CONCEIVABLE SOLUTIONS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
IMPLICATIONS 
The Court has—either implicitly or explicitly—recognized 
five conceptual alternatives to the Guidelines. Each of these 
five solutions has slightly different implications for the separa-
tion of powers analysis. The first option is to return to a man-
datory Guidelines system. Although a conceptual possibility, 
this is not a serious option after Apprendi or the constitutional 
majority’s decision in Booker.248 As discussed above, the pre-
Booker Guidelines were inconsistent with any robust under-
standing of the separation of powers.249 Retaining the pre-
Booker Guidelines is not a viable solution.250 It is mentioned 
here only as a reference point by which to measure the other 
options. 
The “undefined approach” is the second possible solution. 
Justice Stevens described this approach in his McMillan dis-
 
 247. Cf. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (2007) (discussing the 
rationale behind the presumption of reasonableness for sentences within the 
Guidelines); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005) (analyzing 
the Guidelines in light of the Sixth Amendment); Barkow, supra note 91, at 
1042–43 (discussing the failure of Booker to address the separation of powers 
issue). 
 248. Cf. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–27; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
497 (2000). 
 249. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042–43. 
 250. Booker, 543 U.S. at 232. 
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sent.251 Under this system, the legislature defines very basic 
crimes punishable by extremely wide sentencing ranges.252 
Within that range, Congress defines mitigating factors or af-
firmative defenses that the judge must take into account. 
Through those mitigating factors and affirmative defenses, 
Congress exerts some control over the sentences given to the 
defendants.253 This is similar to the system the Court approved 
in Patterson.254  
Removing the sections of the statute that render the 
Guidelines mandatory is the third option.255 The remedial ma-
jority in Booker endorsed this approach.256 The Guidelines re-
main in place, but are not binding on sentencing judges.257 The 
judge is instructed to take the Guidelines into account when 
making his ruling but is no longer forced to comply.258 
Both of these possibilities—the “undefined approach” and 
the advisory Guidelines—are more effective than the retention 
of the pre-Booker system, but they fail to resolve the structural 
problems. They are attempts to resolve the individual rights is-
sue while side-stepping the separation of powers issue. Under 
these systems, the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process 
Clause are satisfied since the elements of the crime are proven 
to a jury.259 But the legislature still controls, through influence 
and judicial acquiescence, the individual sentences given out to 
defendants.260 Without question, Congress’s influence is less 
heavy-handed than under the mandatory Guidelines. Neverthe-
 
 251. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 100–04 (1986) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
 252. See id.  
 253. See id. 
 254. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210–11 (1977) (upholding New 
York’s murder statute despite its lack of a mens rea component). Technically, 
the provision in Patterson was an affirmative defense rather than a mitigating 
factor, but the comparison is still effective. The point is that the legislature is 
defining crimes with broad sentencing ranges but indicating that certain facts 
ought to decrease the defendants’ exposure to punishment. 
 255. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the 
Court in part) (“We conclude that this provision must be severed and 
excised . . . .”). 
 256. See id. 
 257. See id. at 264 (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the 
Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when 
sentencing.”). 
 258. Id. 
 259. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000); In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 385–86 (1970). 
 260. See Barkow, supra note 91, at 1042–43. 
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less, subtle legislative coercion of judicial authority is no less a 
violation of the separation of powers.261 
The fourth solution is to hold the Guidelines unconstitu-
tional and scrap the entire system.262 This is a return to the 
pre-Guidelines sentencing system of Mullaney, whereby Con-
gress defines crimes with a range of possible sentences and the 
sentencing judge has discretion to sentence anywhere within 
that range.263 This is no different from the system in place prior 
to McMillan.264 
The fifth and final option, the “jury-proof Guidelines,” re-
tains the mandatory nature of the Guidelines but requires that 
all facts necessary to determine the sentence under the Guide-
lines be proven to a jury.265 Justice Stevens presented this solu-
tion in his Booker dissent.266 Conceptually, this is no different 
than complete invalidation because the legislature is defining 
facts that, if proved to a jury, trigger a punishment range.267  
An example will prove helpful. Assume, for the sake of this 
hypothetical, that a mandatory guidelines system is in place. 
Assume that Congress has defined larceny as “the unlawful 
taking of chattels” and prescribed a maximum punishment of 
ten years in prison. Assume that the guidelines instruct the 
sentencing judge that, if he finds at sentencing that the chattel 
is worth more than fifty dollars, then the appropriate punish-
ment is between five and ten years. Finally, assume that the 
 
 261. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–30 (1935) 
(discussing whether indirect, as well as direct, coercion is inconsistent with 
the separation of powers). 
 262. See id. 
 263. But see Weinstein, supra note 2, at 429–30 (arguing that a complete 
invalidation is unnecessary to return to a pre-McMillan sentencing scheme). 
 264. See generally Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. 
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
 265. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 284–85 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“I would simply allow the Government to continue doing what it 
has done since this Court handed down Blakely—prove any fact that is re-
quired to increase a defendant’s sentence under the Guidelines to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”).  
 266. See id. 
 267. See id. at 284–85 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that jury fact-
finding under the Guidelines passes the requisite constitutional tests). In 
practice, this system would be slightly odd, but not actually any different from 
the first option. It would make the factors in the Guidelines elements of crimes 
that are independently defined in other statutes. To discover what elements 
must be proven, the prosecutor would be forced to look not only at the underly-
ing statute but also at the Guidelines. 
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Court holds the system unconstitutional and is fashioning a 
remedy.268  
Under the fourth solution—complete invalidation—the 
guidelines would be meaningless. The definition of larceny 
would be “unlawful taking of chattels” and the maximum pu-
nishment would be ten years in prison. The judge would be free 
to sentence a man convicted of larceny to anywhere between 
zero and ten years depending on the judge’s knowledge and ex-
perience.  
Under the jury-proof Guidelines the definition of larceny 
would change as a result of the guidelines. There would effec-
tively be two separate crimes: “Larceny of chattels worth less 
than fifty dollars,” with a punishment range of zero to five 
years, and “Larceny of chattels worth more than fifty dollars,” 
with a punishment range of five to ten years. If the jury con-
victed a man of the latter, the judge would then be free to sen-
tence him to anywhere between five and ten year depending on 
the judge’s discretion.  
Both of these options have positive implications for the 
structural problems inherent in the Guidelines. They resolve 
the separation of powers issue by placing the legislature back 
in the position of defining crimes and sentencing ranges instead 
of limiting judicial discretion within a range.269 Once the jury 
determines that the defendant committed the proscribed act, 
the judge is free to exercise his discretion and sentence the in-
dividual defendant anywhere within the statutory range. Con-
gress’s action in both of these solutions defines crimes and at-
taches punishment ranges but does not limit judicial discretion 
within those ranges.  
Given that these solutions—complete invalidation and the 
jury-proof Guidelines—are the only alternatives that resolve 
the structural issues, the next step is to contrast the relative 
merits of complete invalidation against those of a mandatory 
Guidelines system requiring jury proof of the relevant facts. 
B. COMPLETE INVALIDATION VERSUS JURY-PROOF GUIDELINES 
Structurally, these two solutions are indistinguishable. It 
is, therefore, necessary to examine the relative merits of these 
options on factors above and beyond the separation of powers. 
 
 268. This is precisely the issue that was presented to the remedial majority 
in Booker. Id. at 246 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). 
 269. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 6, at 479 (defining the legislative role). 
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The following discussion examines these alternatives in light of 
the individual rights concerns, the opportunity for sentencing 
disparity, and the ease of implementation. While neither alter-
native is perfect, they are both superior to the current system 
because—as this Section will make clear—their problems do 
not arise from the Constitution. This Section concludes that the 
Court—in accordance with the separation of powers—must al-
low Congress to make the decision between these two options 
because the decision rests on policy determinations, rather 
than on constitutional analysis.  
1. Complete Invalidation: The Return to Mullaney 
Employing the rhetoric of the remedial majority, invalidat-
ing the Guidelines outright and returning to a pre-1984 sen-
tencing structure is the most “radical” resolution.270 There is no 
question that this option resolves the individual rights concerns 
of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The 
Court has consistently upheld the traditional sentencing sys-
tem in the face of individual rights challenges.271 According to 
Apprendi, the individual rights provisions entitle the defendant 
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury of every element of 
a crime.272 This would not be an issue with a return to the pre-
Guidelines system. Returning to the larceny example, under 
the complete invalidation solution, the elements of larceny are 
that a chattel was taken and that the taking was unlawful. Be-
fore being convicted, the accused would be entitled to proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury on both of those elements. 
This fully satisfies the individual rights concerns of the Sixth 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause. 
With the structural and individual rights concerns alle-
viated, the question is one of disparity.273 There is little ques-
 
 270. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–47 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
delivering the opinion of the Court in part) (discussing which remedy would 
deviate least radically from Congress’s intent). 
 271. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 216 (1977) (upholding a 
conviction under the New York murder statute on the grounds that the New 
York system was consistent with the Due Process Clause). 
 272. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 273. Disparity is particularly relevant in this context because of the role it 
played in leading to the creation of the Guidelines in the first place. Given that 
sentencing disparity was a principal motivation behind the Guidelines, it is 
intuitive to prefer an alternative that minimizes the perceived problem. 
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tion that the traditional sentencing system is susceptible to 
disparities in sentencing.274 As long as judges are allowed dis-
cretion to sentence within a statutory range, there will be dis-
parities between the sentences imposed on individual defen-
dants.275 This is, however, not necessarily a negative. A 
primary justification for judicial discretion is to ensure propor-
tionality in sentencing.276 For centuries, the American criminal 
justice system recognized that no two defendants are alike and 
that the sentence ought to be tailored to each specific case.277 It 
is, therefore, not entirely clear that reducing sentencing dispar-
ity is a laudable goal.278 It is possible that the mechanical ap-
plication of uniform sentences to all defendants, regardless of 
individual circumstances, will lead to as many, if not more, un-
just sentences than will judicial discretion.279 As such, dispa-
rate sentences may actually be more “just” than the uniform 
sentences promoted by the Guidelines.280 If this is the case, it is 
difficult to justify support for the Guidelines. 
This is true, however, only if the disparity is not a result of 
illegitimate sentencing factors such as race or social class. This 
was the primary criticism of the traditional model prior to the 
Guidelines.281 The studies upon which those criticisms were 
based, however, have been called into question.282 Based on 
 
 274. See Stith & Koh, supra note 18, at 228–29 (surveying the criticisms 
levied against the traditional model, particularly those regarding disparity in 
sentencing). 
 275. See Gertner, supra note 21, at 528–29 (“Disparity inheres in any sys-
tem that seeks to provide proportional punishment, that tailors the punish-
ment to fit, not just the crime, but the criminal, and that purports to be a na-
tional system.”). 
 276. See id.  
 277. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 104–06 (arguing that unifor-
mity in sentencing is not consistent with just sentencing). 
 278. Id. 
 279. See id. at 105 (“We reject the premise of sentencing reformers that 
uniform treatment mean equal treatment, and thus that judicial discretion . . . 
necessarily denies justice.”). 
 280. See id. (“A just sentence must also be a reasoned sentence and a pro-
portional sentence, imposed through procedures that comport with basic un-
derstandings of fairness and Due Process of law in a constitutional scheme of 
checks and balances.”). 
 281. See Breyer, supra note 20, at 4–5 (discussing unwarranted disparity 
as a motivating factor behind the Guidelines); see also STITH & CABRANES, 
supra note 5, at 104 (“Reduction of ‘unwarranted sentencing disparities’ was 
a—probably the—goal of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.”). 
 282. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 106–12 (criticizing the pre-
Guidelines empirical research on sentencing disparity and factors such as 
race). 
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more current research, it does not appear that the sentencing 
disparities were correlated with the illegitimate factors.283  
Even if judges did not take illegitimate factors into ac-
count, it is not beyond their power to do so under the tradition-
al system. The issue, then, is whether a system can be put in 
place that is consistent with the traditional model but also en-
sures that judges do not consider illegitimate factors while ex-
ercising their discretion. While crafting such a system is 
beyond the scope of this analysis, there is no reason to believe 
that it is an insurmountable obstacle. It is worth pointing out, 
however, that illegitimate disparity is the largest potential 
drawback of the traditional sentencing model.284 
The final issue is the ease of implementation. This is, on its 
face, a selling point for the traditional model. The system was 
in place for over a century in this country and returning to it 
would require nothing more than the invalidation of the Guide-
lines.285 Opponents of the traditional model have advanced var-
ious arguments on this issue.286 The primary arguments are 
that judges do not want the responsibility associated with 
broad discretion287 or that they lack any special competence in 
the area of sentencing.288 These objections, however, do not car-
ry significant weight.  
First, sentencing is intended to be a solemn, difficult affair 
that the Constitution entrusted to the judiciary.289 Our system 
does not allow Congress to avoid difficult or distasteful policy 
decisions simply because it does not want the responsibility. In 
the same way, it must not allow judges to shirk their sentenc-
 
 283. See id. at 111 (“In particular, every study of the federal courts in the 
pre-Guidelines era found that race was not a significant factor in explaining 
variation in sentences.”). 
 284. See id. 
 285. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–50 (2005) (Breyer, J., 
delivering the opinion of the Court in part). 
 286. See Gertner, supra note 21, at 537–38 (describing judges’ reactions to 
the prospect of abandoning the Guidelines). 
 287. Alex Kozinski, Carthage Must Be Destroyed, 12 FED SENT’G REP. 67, 
67 (2002) (“I found sentencing traumatic in the pre-Guidelines days. . . . 
Somehow I felt it was wrong for one human being to have that much power 
over another. . . . Sentencing ranges [under the Guidelines] are narrow and 
presumably take into account all of those factors I don’t feel competent to 
weigh . . . .”). 
 288. See Gertner, supra note 21, at 537–38 (describing judges’ reactions to 
the prospect of abandoning the Guidelines). 
 289. See Oberdorfer, supra note 10, at 14 (describing sentencing prior to 
the Guidelines as a “serious and solemn ceremony”). 
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ing duty because it is unpleasant. Judicial sentencing ensures 
that the government contemplates the decision to divest a per-
son of his liberty in each and every case.290 Forcing an agent of 
the government—the judge—to stand eye-to-eye with the de-
fendant and make a decision regarding the length of imprison-
ment injects a level of individuality into the system.291 While it 
is certainly easier for a judge to apply the Guidelines mechani-
cally, that comes with the risk of a more fundamentally unfair 
sentence from the failure to take into account each person’s in-
dependent circumstances.292  
Second, it is difficult to believe that judges have somehow 
lost the ability to exercise their discretion since 1984.293 To ar-
gue that judges are not competent to decide appropriate sen-
tences flies in the face of two centuries worth of criminal juris-
prudence.294 There is no reason to believe that judges are any 
less competent at sentencing now than they were prior to the 
implementation of the Guidelines.  
On balance, a return to the traditional sentencing model is 
an attractive solution. Not only does it resolve the individual 
rights concerns, it is also a simple solution to implement. The 
question for Congress is what level of disparity is acceptable as 
a matter of public policy. Again, this is not a question within 
the particular competence of the judiciary. 
2. Jury-Proof Guidelines 
The jury-proof Guidelines proposed by Justice Stevens are 
a less radical option than complete invalidation.295 Consistent 
 
 290. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 78. 
 291. See id. (“The judge’s power—duty—to weigh all of the circumstances 
of the particular case, and all of the purposes of criminal punishment, 
represented an important acknowledgement of the moral personhood of the 
defendant and the moral dimension of crime and punishment.”); Gertner, 
supra note 21, at 538 (“[Sentencing] is about proportionality; it requires indi-
vidualizing so that the punishment fits the crime.”). 
 292. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 105 (defining a just sentence 
as one that is proportional, reasoned, and procedurally correct); Oberdorfer, 
supra note 10, at 16 (describing the inherent risk of unfair sentences asso-
ciated with the rigidity of the Guidelines). 
 293. See Gertner, supra note 21, at 538 (rejecting arguments that judges 
are somehow incompetent to determine appropriate sentences). 
 294. See id. at 527 (discussing the pre-Guidelines conception of judges as 
“expert[s]” in sentencing). 
 295. Justice Breyer argued in Booker that this was a more radical depar-
ture than advisory Guidelines. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 
246–49 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). But, be-
cause an advisory Guidelines system fails to address the separation of powers, 
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with the traditional model, there is little doubt that this system 
would resolve the individual rights problems.296 In fact, this 
system was originally conceived with those problems in 
mind.297 Under the individual rights analysis, the question is 
whether all facts necessary to impose a particular punishment 
have been proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.298 The 
jury-proof Guidelines are perfectly consistent with those indi-
vidual rights concerns. Returning again to the larceny example, 
under the jury-proof Guidelines there are two separate crimes: 
“Larceny of chattels worth more than fifty dollars” and “Larce-
ny of chattels worth less than fifty dollars.” This system impos-
es an additional element—the value of the chattel—that must 
be proven to a jury. Before being convicted, a defendant would 
be entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury of all of 
the elements, including the value of the chattel. Like the com-
plete invalidation system, this fully satisfies the individual 
rights concerns of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process 
Clause. The jury-proof Guidelines would undoubtedly create 
more specific crimes with narrower sentencing ranges, but that 
is irrelevant to the individual rights question.299  
Whereas the traditional model raises concerns about dis-
parity, the jury-proof Guidelines err on the side of consisten-
cy.300 Incorporating the jury into the Guidelines system would, 
as the larceny example suggested, effectively create new crimes 
 
it is not an acceptable option. 
 296. Even the remedial majority in Booker recognized that jury fact-finding 
was a sufficient solution to the constitutional issues. See id. (accepting Ste-
vens’ jury-proof system as a possible solution, but rejecting it on prudential 
grounds). 
 297. See id. at 284–85 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the appropri-
ate solution to the individual rights concerns arising from the Guidelines is to 
require jury fact-finding for sentencing). 
 298. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 299. The legislature is free, within the confines of the Constitution, to de-
fine crimes and sentencing ranges as it sees fit. See Redish & Cisar, supra 
note 6, at 479–80. There is no due process or Sixth Amendment problem if the 
legislature decides to divide larceny into two separate crimes, petit and grand 
larceny, with more narrow sentencing ranges attached to each, so long as the 
element that distinguishes the two is proven to a jury. 
 300. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 296–97 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Congress’s intent to minimize disparities is the cen-
terpiece of this system). 
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with much narrower sentencing ranges.301 This limited range 
for judicial discretion would make it nearly impossible for the 
disparities that occurred in the 1970s to repeat themselves. 
Certainly disparities could arise, just as they did under the 
traditional model. But the scope of the disparity would likely be 
smaller because the ranges available under the Guidelines are 
extremely narrow compared to the traditional sentencing 
ranges. 
The difficulty of implementation is the major drawback of 
this system.302 The remedial majority in Booker cited this as 
one of the main reasons it decided to forego this alternative.303 
Justice Breyer argued that this system would place a massive 
administrative burden on the prosecution and the jury.304 
There is credence to this argument. Requiring that all elements 
of a Guidelines sentence be proven to a jury forces the prosecu-
tor to be very specific with the crime charged and proven.305 It 
also complicates the jury’s decision.306 Justice Stevens respond-
ed to these arguments in his Booker dissent.307 He argued first 
that the parade-of-horribles that Justice Breyer envisioned was 
unlikely to occur with any frequency.308 His second, and more 
convincing argument, was that “the Constitution does not per-
mit efficiency to be [the] primary concern.”309 The jury is rarely, 
if ever, the most efficient means of adjudicating guilt, but it is 
the system chosen by the framers and ingrained in the Consti-
tution.310  
 
 301. See id. 
 302. See id. at 254 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). 
 303. See id. (“Third, the sentencing statutes, read to include the Court’s 
Sixth Amendment requirement, would create a system far more complex than 
Congress could have intended.”). 
 304. See id. (describing the procedural difficulties that might face juries 
and prosecutors under the “jury-proof Guidelines”). 
 305. See id. (“How would courts and counsel work with an indictment and a 
jury trial that involved not just whether a defendant robbed a bank but also 
how?”). 
 306. See id. at 254–55 (indicating all of the minute factual matters that the 
jury would have to decide and arguing that this would unduly hamper the 
criminal system). 
 307. See id. at 288–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 308. See id. (arguing that those procedural difficulties would only be impli-
cated in a “small number” of cases). 
 309. Id. at 289 (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 312–13 (2004)). 
 310. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (“[The jury trial] has never been efficient; but it has always been 
free.”); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (“The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention 
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That argument carries weight against the advisory Guide-
lines adopted by the remedial majority but not against com-
plete invalidation. The argument that the advisory Guidelines 
should be adopted instead of the jury-proof Guidelines because 
they are more efficient and easier to implement can easily be 
trumped by arguing that the advisory Guidelines are a viola-
tion of the separation of powers. That argument doesn’t work 
against complete invalidation. Because they are on equal con-
stitutional footing, the efficiency and ease of implementation of 
the two systems can be directly compared. It is not, however, 
the Court’s role to make that decision. 
In the end, the differences between the traditional model 
and the jury-proof Guidelines—namely, sentencing disparity 
and administrative burdens—are matters of public policy that 
Congress rather than the judiciary ought to decide. Both alter-
natives resolve the structural and individual rights concerns. 
Constitutionally, the options are indistinguishable. The differ-
ences arise in the discussion of disparity and the burdens of 
implementation, which are properly within the purview of Con-
gress. Congress must weigh the importance of uniform sen-
tences against the added administrative burdens associated 
with retaining the Guidelines. The most the Court can do is 
hold the Guidelines unconstitutional and make the acceptable 
alternatives clear for Congress. The ultimate decision, however, 
must lie in the hands of a politically accountable branch of gov-
ernment. 
  CONCLUSION   
Defendants have attacked, and the Supreme Court has 
thoroughly examined, the individual rights implications of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Unfortunately, the Court has 
overlooked the parallel structural violation. The unique solu-
tion created in Booker and Rita, however, exposed the hidden 
separation of powers issue. This Note demonstrates that the 
Guidelines are a legislative attempt to control individual sen-
tencing and a legislative exercise of judicial authority in viola-
tion of the separation of powers. So long as the Guidelines re-
main in place, without requiring proof before a jury, they will 
take power away from the judiciary and increase the power of 
Congress in violation of the separation of powers. 
 
of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary pow-
er.”).  
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The Court’s sentencing jurisprudence failed to take the se-
paration of powers into account and, as a result, created insuf-
ficient remedies to the constitutional problems underlying the 
Guidelines. The individual rights analysis derived from the Ap-
prendi line of cases has proven inadequate to deal with the 
structural concerns presented by the Guidelines. To fully re-
solve the constitutional issues, the Court must acknowledge the 
separation of powers and incorporate it into the analysis.  
That does not mean that the Guidelines must necessarily 
be abolished. The Court can present Congress with constitu-
tionally sound alternatives to the Guidelines. Presenting this 
choice to Congress would treat the Guidelines in the same way 
that the Court has treated prior legislative actions. It is possi-
ble for the Court to resolve all of the constitutional issues while 
at the same time allowing Congress the flexibility to promote 
whichever constitutional policy it so chooses. 
